The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of 'unequal' bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers.
Introduction
The aim of my contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism, its origin and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. In a nutshell, I will suggest that this distinction, at least in its traditional wording, may well be partial and misleading. In focusing predominantly on just some aspects of the division of tasks between the two chambers of a bicameral legislature -i.e. the ordinary legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote -, the distinction neglects some no less important features of their mutual interplay. As such, a multi-dimensional notion of (im)perfect bicameralism seems better suited to grasp the complexity of the distribution of powers and tasks in a bicameral system. More importantly, it makes it possible to re-establish a strong connection between the functional dimension of bicameralism and other classifications, which, for example, consider the legitimacy of the second chamber and its overall function within the constitutional order.
The paper is structured as follows. In paragraph 2 I will consider two cases, both drawn from recent constitutional developments in France and Spain, which show that traditional understandings of (im)perfect bicameralism do not fully grasp the complex interplay between the two chambers of a bicameral parliament. Paragraph 3 will look into the historical genesis of the distinction between equal and unequal bicameralisms in 19 th century constitutional practice and 20 th century constitution-making processes. Paragraph 4 will focus on a possible alternative reading, in which the multi-dimensional nature of (im)perfect bicameralism is considered in order to stress the link between structure and functions of second chambers. In so doing, I will rely on Palermo and Nicolini's (2013) conception of second chambers as institutions for the representation of pluralism.
Paragraph 5 will discuss the results of this study.
As regards methodological aspects, the analysis will be based on comparison of a number of, mostly, parliamentary constitutional systems. On the whole, bicameralism in non-parliamentary constitutional systems, like the United States, Switzerland and the Latin American federations, seems to be less problematic. A comparative study focusing on federal second chambers pointed out that there seems to be 'a trend or, to put it more 
Recent developments from two imperfect bicameral systems
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In the last few weeks, headlines in French newspapers have been dominated by President Macron's frustration with the explicit opposition of the Senate. For this reason, the President of the Republic has to strive for some kind of compromise with the upper house and, more precisely, with its President, Gérard Larcher. Occasionally, an alternative solution has been suggested by the President's camp: calling for a referendum on the organization of public authorities according to Art. 11 of the Constitution, as General de Gaulle did in 1962.
III However, the constitutionality of such a move would be, to say the least, controversial (see Schoettl 2018) . Español (PSOE). To quote just an example, the Government was persuaded to give up its plan regarding Catalan public media and to accept that control over them would continue to rest with the Parlament (Domínguez and Alberola 2017). This example shows another peculiar situation: even weak second chambers may be entrusted with important specialised tasks, in the fulfilment of which they act alone. The respective specialisations of the two chambers of a bicameral legislature are another problematic aspect in the study of (im)perfect bicameralisms.
The origin of the distinction
An unquestionable character of bicameralism is that it is a classic topic for comparative constitutional studies: in fact, the rise of bicameralism and the frequent complaints about its alleged crisis or decline have coincided with successive steps in the history of constitutionalism and political representation (Bon Valsassina 1959: 207; Weber 1972: 577) . 
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Over the last two centuries, the cyclical salience of these crises has also been a consequence of the problematic status of many second chambers and the quest for viable alternative models. In this respect, the legitimacy of second chambers (be it related to aristocratic representation, territorial representation or considered reflection: see Passaglia 2018) and the procedures for appointing or electing their members have always been at the heart of discussions about bicameralism. This has not been the case with the functions of second chambers. At the very outset these used to be put on equal footing with first chambers and to be entrusted with the same function: functional differentiation was a subsequent step in the history of bicameral legislatures, and the distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism is the most recent attempt at classification of bicameral legislatures (Luther 2006: 24-25, Palermo and Nicolini 2013: 73) . Put differently, this criterion for classification has been heavily influenced by other, longer-established criteria: powers and functions of second chambers 'depend on the representativeness of the elective body and the way its members are appointed ' (de Vergottini 2004: 408) .
Bicameralism in the 19
th century: formal equality between the two chambers
In the 'long 19 th century', as it was labelled by Eric Hobsbawm (1962), a basic feature of bicameralism was that the two chambers, as different as they were, were put on an entirely equal footing. Basically, this meant, first, that the two chambers had equal power throughout the legislative process and, second, that the government of the day had to maintain the confidence of both the lower and the upper house. The constitutional history of the 3 rd Republic in France is quite eloquent in this regard: the indirectly elected Senate pushed the Government of the day to resign in 1876 , 1883 , 1890 , 1896 , 1913 , 1930 , 1932 , and 1938 (Goyard 1982 Garrigues 2010 Garrigues : 1179 Macdonald, the Senate 'is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch and preventing any hasty or ill-considered legislation which may come from that body, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and well understood wishes of the people' (quoted by Vipond 2017: 95). In his major study of post-war democracy, Lord Bryce aptly epitomised the result of a century of constitutional development: in his analysis of French bicameralism, he held that '[t]he relations of the Senate to the Chamber are determined by its powers, which are weaker in fact than they seem on paper. … Not venturing to stem the current that runs strongly towards democracy, it has accepted a position inferior to that for which it was designed' (Bryce 1921: 236).
Imperfect bicameralism: an episode in the rationalisation of parliamentarism
Greater functional differentiation between the two chambers -and, more often than not, the curtailment of the powers of the second chamber -was a typical component of the constitutions enacted in the aftermath of World War I. In fact, it might be described as a 'moderate' alternative to the introduction of unicameralism (as constitution makers did in Furthermore, the Italian model of equal bicameralism was clearly at odds with any programme of rationalised parliamentarism, to which the Constituent Assembly itself was committed at the outset (so-called ordine del giorno Perassi, aiming at ensuring governmental stability and preventing 'degenerations of the parliamentary system'). Republic, which launched a kind of asymmetric regionalisation, even favoured unicameralism over a combination of regional and corporatist bicameralism (Fernández Riquelme 2009: 193-195) . Indeed, in chronological terms, the rationalisation of parliamentarism went hand in hand with new constitutional experimentations in the field of vertical separation of powers: Gaspare Ambrosini's theory of the 'regional state' is the most powerful attempt at theorising the implications of such a shift (Ambrosini 1944; see also Mirkine-Guetzévitch 1931: 20-25) . As the Austrian example shows, second chambers were obviously affected by the emergence of those novel forms of state.
As critics have noted, functional differentiation of the chambers of bicameral 
From legislation to constitutional amendment rules: a multidimensional notion of imperfect bicameralism
As mentioned in paragraph 1, discussions about the classification of bicameral systems along the perfect-imperfect alternative prove ultimately unable to grasp the full picture. In In empirical terms too, the bicameral structure of a legislature is generally described as a key issue for assessing the difficulty of amending a constitution. Moreover, legislative bicameralism has been found out to be one of the most decisive factors in assessing how easily a constitution can be amended: as one scholar argued, 'legislative complexity -the requirement of special majorities or separate majorities in different legislative sessions or bicamerality -is the key variable to explaining amendment rates' ( In a way, this is the same reason why equal bicameralism is preserved when it comes to constitutional amendment rules (see above in paragraph 4).
In less generic terms, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was marked by an attempt at strengthening the democratic bases of the Union, with an eye both to representative and participatory democracy. In this respect, the contribution of national terms -were much more active than lower houses' (Romaniello 2015: 9, also pointing at the considerable impact of the idiosyncrasies of each Member State and 'the contrast between the blind and equal approach adopted by the EU and the complexity of national constitutional settings'). Thus, second chambers may take the initiative in a way which completely escapes the traditional alternative between perfect and imperfect bicameralism: both chambers may act -and their action obviously impacts on the domestic setting -but they can do so independently from one another.
Concluding remarks
Comparative analysis in the previous paragraph has pointed to the decline of equal bicameralism both in institutional practice and in formal constitutional provisions.
Meanwhile, it has shown that the contemporary scene is marked by a number of phenomena and trends which somehow escape a too rigid dichotomy. For the purposes of a concluding assessment, the first point which deserves attention is the depth of change over the last two centuries. The issues underlying the distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism are less stable than those related to the legitimacy and institutional position of second chambers: 'The structures and functions of second chambers always differ but it seems to be the functions and not the structures that are more susceptible to change' (Luther 2006: 25) . Two examples will suffice. The powers and competences of the In light of that evolution, the traditional distinction between equal and unequal bicameralism does not seem to be able to grasp the current complexity of the distribution of powers and tasks within a bicameral legislature. Indeed, the two chambers of the very same parliament may well be placed on equal footing in some respects, whereas the will of the lower house generally prevails on all other occasions. Because of its genetic relationship with Mirkine-Guetzévitch's theory of rationalised parliamentarism (see above in paragraph 3.2), the distinction, in its classical meaning, almost exclusively focuses on two decisive features of parliamentary regimes, i.e. the ordinary legislative process and the confidence vote. On a different note, equal bicameralism is now an exception, while there are multiple models of bicameralism, ranging from 'almost equal' to the actual subordination of the second chamber. That is why constitutional law analyses need a multidimensional analysis of unequal bicameralism, which allows the complexity of the tasks of present-dayparliaments to be grasped. Furthermore, as has been argued in paragraph 4, a more complex understanding of unequal bicameralism makes it possible to do justice to the link between the structure and functions of second chambers. In doing so, the great diversity of contemporary constitutional arrangements should always be kept in mind: indeed, 'there is no one model of bicameralism, neither is there any unique institutional arrangement, but each model is the outcome of national constitutional designers for maximizing the benefits' III On that occasion too, General de Gaulle was also trying to impose his will against the opposition of the Senate. IV French senators are elected by indirect universal suffrage. Its members are elected in each Department (Département) by an electoral college composed of members of the National Assembly from that Department and delegates from regional and local government councils. Senatorial elections are held every three years to renew half of the members of the Senate. V These authors, like the overwhelming majority of scholars both in Spain and elsewhere, generally stress the inability of the Spanish Senate to fulfil its institutional mission as 'the house of territorial representation' (Art. 69(1) of the Constitution of 1978). According to Art. 69 of the Constitution of 1978, the Senate is predominantly composed of directly elected members. Each Province elects four senators, with special arrangements for the insular Provinces in the Balearic and Canary Islands and the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Moreover, the legislatures of the sixteen Autonomous Communities appoint one senator each and a further Senator for every million inhabitants in their respective territories. To date, the Senate is composed of 266 members, with 208 senators elected by popular vote and 58 appointed by autonomic legislatures. VI Scholars have generally highlighted the similarities between the procedure under Art. 155 of the Spanish Constitution and the German 'federal coercion' (Bundeszwang) regulated by Art. 38 of the Fundamental Law: still, a major difference between the Spanish and German procedures 'is to be found in the considerable difference between the Spanish Senate and the German Bundesrat with regard to their status as chambers of territorial representation. … the significance of the Spanish Senate is radically different from that of the Bundesrat as guarantor of the rights and interests of the Länder in the application of constitutional provisions regarding federal coercion. The consequence of this is that two virtually identical provisions in terms of their formal drafting ultimately have in their practical application very different characteristics in the application of an extraordinary measure such as federal coercion' (López-Basaguren 2017: 310). VII There had been disagreement among 3 rd Republic public law scholars with regard to the power of the Senate to overthrow the Government of the day, with Adhémar Esmein favouring the negative interpretation and Léon Duguit claiming that the sitting Government should resign after being defeated in the Senate (see However, Maitland (1909: 348) also refers that the creation of new peers was discouraged in late 19 th century: 'The power of creating new peers is obviously an important engine in the hands of a minister. During the last century peerages were lavishly created for political purposes. … In much more recent times the power of creating new peers has been used for a great end. In 1832 the House of Lords was practically coerced into the passing of the Reform Bill by the knowledge that if they again rejected it the king was prepared to consent to the creation of eighty new peerages. Thus a threat to create new peerages may be a potent political instrument; but for obvious reasons a minister would shrink from using it save in an extreme case -he could not see the end of his action; he would be creating heritable rights, and the political opinions of heirs are not always those of their ancestors'. X 'As an appointed body, the Senate was simultaneously enabled and constrained. Which is to say that the Senate was deliberately designed to allow competing principles -democratic and anti-democratic -to co-exist over the long term. And, indeed, despite many attempts either to reform or abolish it, the Senate remains largely intact -sustained by the ambivalence with which it was designed' (Vipond 2017: 95). Still, some examples of successful opposition of the Senate can be found even in the second half of the 20 th century (see Brun, Tremblay et Brouillet 2008: 339-40) . XI It will suffice to mention the British Parliament Act 1949 and the initial text of the Constitution of the 4 th French Republic, which considerably diminished the role of the Senate, by then relabelled 'Council of the Republic'. XII Still, recent studies have showed that the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution of the United States was to entrust the Senate with the task of both representing the States and providing second thought to the law-making process -but this nuance has greatly lost its significance (Beaud 2007: 357-63, Palermo and Kössler 2017: 75-76) . XIII The German 'ambassadorial' model of representation of the interests of the Länder has always been an outlier. XIV The Catholic and Pan-German parties were successful in supporting the idea of a bicameral parliament for a federal Austria, but the Social Democrats finally succeeded in weakening the position of the Bundesrat in the constitutional order. XV This reflects the structural alternative -which can ultimately be traced back to the Abbé Sieyès -between the dubious legitimacy of non-democratic second chambers and the risk of transforming them into mere duplicates of first chambers (see Mirkine-Guetzévitch 1931: 25) . XVI In Canada, current parliamentary practice is rather based on the exchange of messages between the House of Commons and the Senate (Pinard 2006: 491) . XVII Interesting evidence from the third (and, to date, last) cohabitation in France (1997 France ( -2002 suggests that the activities of the Mixed Committee quite often allowed the Senate and the National Assembly to reach an agreement on a common text (Bernard 2001: 451) . XVIII Another example of the conundrum underlying the Italian model of equal bicameralism can be found in the controversial message which Francesco Cossiga, then President to the Republic, sent to Parliament on 26 June 1991: the President argued that 'the principle of bicameralism, and perhaps even so-called equal bicameralism' amounted to an unamendable principle of the Italian constitutional order. According to critics, however, the President purposefully overemphasised the width of the area of the untouchable core of the Italian Constitution in order to hint at the inherent limitations of the constitutional amendment power and to promote the launch of a fully-fledged constituent process (see Luciani 2010: 592). XIX Another plausible example is provided by states of emergence and declarations of war: see e.g. Articles 35 and 36 of the French Constitution and Art. 39(3) of the Czech Constitution. XX However, according to scholars, first reading impression is incorrect: 'A proposed law approved by the Senate but not by the House, wherein the government controls a majority of votes, will not be permitted by the prime minister to go to referendum. But in the reverse situation, a Governor-General would be compelled to act on a prime minister's advice to submit to the electors a proposed law approved only by the House' (Stone 2006: 561-62) . XXI For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to look into the nature of the German Bundesrat and the possibility to classify it as a second chamber or simply as a constitutional organ performing tasks similar to those of a parliamentary assembly (but see Herzog 2005: 955-56). XXII In fact. Art. 167(2) provides for a limited exception: if a constitutional amendment bill has not been approved by a majority of three-fifths of members of each house, and provided that the text has been passed by a majority of the members of the Senate, the Congress may pass the amendment by a two-thirds vote (see also Castellà Andreu 2006: 890 the Conseil constitutionnel the law determining the number of local councillors of each Department and each Region; that they challenge the procedure by which it was adopted … Considering that the draft bill tabled in the National Assembly, as the first house to be seized, had the sole objective of determining the number of local councillors comprising the deliberative assembly of each Department and of each Region; that the rules governing the organisation of local authorities include the determination of the number of members of their deliberative assembly; that accordingly, the draft bill that resulted in the law referred was incorrectly tabled first other than in the Senate; that consequently, the law was adopted according to an unconstitutional procedure; that, without any requirement to examine any other complaint, it must be ruled unconstitutional'.
